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Abstract  
This article considers the (in)ability of international law to ensure compliance from 
United Nations (UN) Member States, absent political influence. It examines whether 
concepts such as sovereign equality, normativity and concreteness give legal 
authority to international law, and further whether this ‘authority’ is respected by 
Member States and strictly enforced by UN governing bodies and international 
courts. The article explains that where sovereign rights or national interests collide 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is often unable to give a ruling or advisory 
opinion based solely on legal grounds, and demonstrates that the contemporary 
international regime is incapable of removing politics from international legal 
proceedings. Furthermore, the article analyses the United Nations Security Council’s 
(UNSC) failure to enforce ICJ rulings against the US and the inability to prevent the 
US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. With respect to the Iraq invasion, it highlights how 
this invasion occurred in the face of existing international norms and rules which 
purported to curb unauthorized use-of-force by UN Member States. The paper 
deduces that existing international rules and structures which seek to ignore state 
politics cannot settle contemporary international disputes.  
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Introduction 
The strength of obligations under international law has remained the subject of 
numerous debates amongst international lawyers, jurists and scholars. After the Cold 
War, there was no doubt as to ‘the existence of international law’,1 rather, the only 
remaining questions was what were the sources of this ‘law’2 and whether such a 
legal system was effective in binding states. As was made apparent by the US-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the disapproval of both the international community and the 
UNSC did not stop states from breaching international laws which impeded national 
political interests. This invasion left holes in the theory that the UN Charter3 created 
binding obligations on states and showed how fragile the ‘consensual nature’4 of 
international law can be when conflicts of national interests are involved. This 
consent component stems from the ideal of an international community with ‘equally 
sovereign states creating law through consent and practice’5. It will be argued that 
this idea of sovereign equality and the requirement of state consent are the key 
factors for the continued influence of global politics in the international legal system. 
The first section of this paper provides an analysis of sovereign equality and 
the rulings given by international courts when adjudicating on territorial disputes 
which involve colliding or overlapping sovereign rights; examples will be drawn from 
case law. The second section of discussion outlines the nature of normativity, 
concreteness and rule of law in the international regime.  Attempts to balance these 
concepts will be analysed through examples drawn from International Conventions 
as well as the ICJ’s Advisory Opinions and Proceedings. Finally, this paper will 
                                                        
1
 Duncan B. Hollis, ‘Why State Consent Still Matters–Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing 
Sources of International law’, (2005) 23 Berkeley JIL 137, 137 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Charter of the United Nations, (24 October 1945), 1 UNTS XVI 
4
 Matthew Lister, ‘The Legitimating Role of Consent in International law’, (2011) 11:2 Chicago JIL 663, 
664 
5
 Hollis, (n1), 138 
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examine the fragility of international legal decisions and the implications of these 
fragile decisions.  This third section of the paper underscores just how lacking 
contemporary international enforcement mechanisms are in constraining the use of 
force; this is demonstrated through an in-depth analysis of the Nicaragua v USA6 
case and the US-led Iraq invasion of 2003. Ultimately, the discussion concludes with 
the proposition that international rules which purport to ignore state politics will fail to 
explain state behaviour and to resolve cross-border disputes. 
 
The Principle of Sovereign Equality 
The UN Charter clearly establishes that the organisation was founded ‘on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’.7 Accordingly, as per The Case 
of the S.S “Lotus”, 8 ‘in the absence of [formal] principles’9 which prohibit state action 
at international law, the state is ‘free’10 to ‘do as they please’11. In short, sovereign 
equality means that states have the freedom to decide what rules they desire to be 
bound by. This freedom may be exacted through the formation of treaties, 
conventions or through the use of general international law principles. It is generally 
accepted that international treaties may bind states because they are formed through 
an express ‘consent to be bound’12 and must be complied with under the principle 
pacta sunt servanda. However, the principle of sovereign equality often fails to give a 
clear legal resolution to disputes between states, which arise under rules of 
                                                        
6
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) 
(Merits) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 
7
 UN Charter, (n3), art.2 
8
 The Case of the S.S “Lotus”, [1927] PCIJ Rep Series A No 10 
9
 Ibid.,31 
10
 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International law’, (1990) 1 EJIL 4, 18 
11
Jan Klabbers, ‘Clinching the concept of sovereignty: Wimbledon redux’, (1996) 
<http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Klabbers/JWimbledo.pdf> accessed 3 January 2017,8 
12
 José A. Cabranes, ‘International law by Consent of the Governed’, (2007) 42 Valparaiso University 
Law Review 119, 131 
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customary international law. The pure fact view of sovereignty sees the principle as 
‘something external to the law’;13 international law must accept the principle but 
cannot regulate it. Under this view, sovereign rights are a result of the existing 
factual reality.14 Conversely, the legal view places the principle of sovereignty within 
the ‘law’s substance’15  and sovereign rights flow from what the applicable rules 
determine. 16  However, the principle of sovereignty fails to highlight ‘whose 
interpretation of the criterion […] should be given precedence’.17 As such, states 
often claim the same sovereign rights in international disputes and a resolution 
cannot be obtained solely by reference to the pure fact or legal viewpoints of 
sovereignty. The political outcome of the resultant deadlock is demonstrated by the 
following cases.  
In the Eastern Greenland case,18 the Permanent International Court of Justice 
(PCIJ) had to determine whether Norway or Denmark could claim territorial 
sovereignty over Eastern Greenland. Counsel for Norway submitted that their 
sovereign rights arose through their ‘effective occupation’19 of the territory from July 
10th, 1931. On the other hand, Denmark based its claim through existing 
conventions, signed by Norway, which gave them authority over Greenland. For 
example, counsel for Denmark submitted that the Universal Postal Conventions of 
1920, 1924, and 1929, signed by Norway, established ‘the Faroe Isles and 
Greenland, as being part of Denmark’20. Also, ‘[f]rom 1921 to July 10th, 1931’21, 
                                                        
13
 Koskenniemi, (n10),14 
14
 Ibid.,16 
15
 Ibid.,15 
16
 Ibid.,17 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Eastern Greenland case, [1993] PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 53 
19
 Koskenniemi, (n10), 15 
20
 Greenland, (n18), 68 
21
 Ibid.,63 
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Denmark had ‘displayed and exercised […] sovereign rights’ 22  in the territory. 
Denmark’s submission was targeted at proving a stronger claim of sovereign 
territorial rights, by showing that they had effectively occupied Greenland prior to 
Norway. Additionally, Denmark fortified their position through references to ‘bilateral 
agreements […] and […] various multilateral agreements […] in which Greenland 
had been described as a Danish colony’23.  
Nevertheless, the court chose not to focus on the sources of international law 
presented before them, and instead ruled on the interpretation of the ‘Ihlen 
declaration’24. This declaration refers to a statement made on July 22nd, 1919 by 
Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Ihlen, to the Danish minister which stated 
that ‘the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulties in the settlement of 
the [Greenland] question’.25 The International Court held that the declaration was an 
‘affirmative’ 26  and ‘binding’ 27  statement on Norway with an ‘unconditional and 
definitive’28 promise formed. Furthermore, the declaration was backed by another 
statement by the Norwegian Minister on November 7th, 1919, where he highlighted 
that Norway was pleased ‘to recognise Danish sovereignty over Greenland’29. Thus, 
the court ruled that Norway’s occupation in Greenland was unlawful, not due to 
existing treaties or conventions which claimed that Norway had given their sovereign 
rights over to Denmark, but because of the ‘Ihlen declaration’. The court even went 
so far as to state in their conclusion that there was ‘no need’30 to consider the legal 
questions in the instant case. The ruling was political and safeguarded Norway’s 
                                                        
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid.,68 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid.,71 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid.,72 
29
 Ibid.,73 
30
 Ibid.,74 
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sovereignty. The court avoided the process of navigating through the pure fact or 
legal viewpoints of sovereignty which would have forced them to examine the legal 
questions and sources of international law presented before them. Instead, the court 
in the instant case decided that Norway had lost their case because of their own 
recognition of Danish sovereignty in Greenland evident in the ‘Ihlen declaration’, a 
political statement made by Norway’s foreign minister. 
Similarly, in North Sea Continental Shelf31 the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) had to resolve a dispute regarding the North Sea Continental Shelf shared by 
Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. The Netherlands and Denmark submitted 
that they had coastal rights over the Continental Shelf area as per the principle of 
equidistance outlined in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention;32  conversely, 
Germany argued that the application of the equidistance principle would have an 
inequitable result on their coastal rights and that they were not bound by Article 6 of 
the Convention33. The ICJ refuted the claim submitted by Denmark and Netherlands 
because Germany had not ratified the Convention 34  and as such, absent state 
consent they could not be bound by its rules.  
A further contention made by Denmark and Netherlands was that Germany 
was still bound by Article 6 of the Convention35 even if not party to it, since the 
Convention formed customary international law due to State practice.36 To support 
this assertion ‘fifteen cases [were] cited […] in which continental shelf boundaries 
ha[d] been delimited according to the equidistance principle’. This submission was 
also rejected. The ICJ stated that the submitted cases did not suffice opinio juris 
                                                        
31
 North Sea Continental Shelf (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 
32
 Convention on the Continental Shelf (29 April 1958), 499 UNTS 311, art. 6 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Continental Shelf, (n31), [70] 
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required to prove a customary international law and highlighted that even if these 
cases may have represented a ‘settled practice[s]’ in the international community, 
they did not prove that States carried out these practices because they felt obligated 
to do so in accordance with some rule of law.37 In this vein, the ICJ stated that ‘many 
international acts […] are performed […] only by considerations of courtesy, 
convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty’.38 Absent this subjective 
feeling of legal duty, there could be no customary rule in international law. 
Notably, in the instant case the ICJ had affirmed the pure-fact view of 
sovereign rights that ‘the rights of the coastal State […] exist ipso facto and ab 
initio’39; such rights were ‘exclusive’, with any other state requiring ‘express consent’ 
of the coastal state to utilise this territory.40  However, due to the ambiguity of the 
applicable rule the pure-fact view was abandoned. 41  The issue with such an 
application was that relevant facts could only be deduced ad-lib because there was 
no obligatory codified method. 42  Therefore, with ‘no other single method of 
delimitation…which is in all circumstances obligatory’, the ICJ ruled that delimitation 
between the parties was to be ‘effected […] in accordance with equitable 
principles’.43 Ostensibly, the ICJ’s reliance on the principle of equity within the law,44 
infra legem, created a judgment which was based on an ‘arbitrary’45 and subjective 
notion of justice rather than an objective application of legal concepts. Thus, this 
ruling was inconsistent with the factual matrix under Rule of Law and could only be 
described as political. 
                                                        
37
 Ibid., [77] 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid., [19] 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Koskenniemi, (n10), 19 
42
 Ibid.,18 
43
 Continental Shelf, (n31), [101] 
44
 Ibid.,48 
45
 Koskenniemi, (n10), 19 
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Consequently, international jurisprudence has demonstrated that conflicts 
which arise when state bodies attempt to claim their sovereign rights are generally 
unresolvable through a strict application of international law. This is due to the 
frequent ‘lack […] or […] ambiguity of the relevant rule’46. Therefore, the international 
courts’ decision will often be resolved through a political viewpoint of what 
constitutes equity and justice when resolving conflicts of sovereign rights, as shown 
in the Eastern Greenland47 and North Sea Continental Shelf48 cases.  
Furthermore, the effectiveness of normative and concrete international rules is 
often diminished due to global power politics. This is examined in the next section of 
this paper. 
 
Normativity and Concreteness in International Law 
According to Lord Bingham, the substantive rule of law ‘requires compliance by the 
state with its obligations in international law as in national law’49. An application of 
the rule of law to relations between nations refers to the use of ‘legal concepts, 
standards, institutions and procedures’50 to resolve disputes, in place of ‘arbitrary 
power in international relations [or] settlement by force’51 .  To be effective, the 
international rule of law must be based on ‘verifiable and determining rules’.52 Such 
rules must be both ‘concrete’ and ‘normative’ to avoid the rule of law falling victim to 
international politics. For the law to be concrete, it must reflect verified state practice. 
Yet, for the law to be normative, it must be applicable to states despite their own 
                                                        
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Greenland, (n18) 
48
 Continental Shelf, (n31) 
49
 Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law in the International Legal Order’, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane, 
2010), 110-129, 110 
50
 Ibid.,111 
51
 Ibid.  
52
 Koskenniemi, (n10), 5 
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individual national interests. Any law that is overly concrete, based solely on state 
practices, will appear political because it loses normativity and ability to bind states 
against self-interests, thereby becoming ‘an apology’53 to the less powerful. On the 
other hand, if a law is too normative, it will appear political in another sense due to its 
‘utopian’54 nature and inability to reflect the social realities within states. Thus, in 
international law, it is difficult to prove that a rule is entirely objective and free of any 
kind of political influence. Consequently, international legal concepts have constantly 
failed to provide conclusive resolutions in cross-border conflicts. To support this 
claim, an examination of international jurisprudence and state practice is necessary.  
Attempts to balance normativity and concreteness within international rules 
often lead to a lack of state accountability due to numerous exceptions being made. 
This is illustrated within the construction of International Conventions and Advisory 
Opinions of the ICJ. For example, the Genocide Convention55  seeks to resolve 
disputes and punish parties responsible for genocide, a jus cogens prohibition, yet 
the US was able to insert a reservation that required any party wishing to sue them 
to first obtain ‘the specific consent of the United States’.56  As a result, the ICJ 
indicated that US’ reservation prevented Yugoslavia from suing them under the 
Genocide Convention in 1999 and as such refused the case57 on a jurisdictional 
issue; this meant that Yugoslavia could not hold the US accountable for conducting 
targeted bombings in Yugoslavian territory, even though US’ action was a clear 
violation of the international obligation to not use force against another state.58 The 
                                                        
53
 Ibid.,11 
54
 Ibid.,8 
55
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948),       
78 UNTS 227 
56
 Sean D. Murphy, ‘The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping with 
Antinomies’, The United States and International Courts and Tribunals (Cesare Romano, 2008), 21 
57
 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States) (Provisional Measures) [1999] ICJ 916 
58
 Ibid. 
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Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons59 reached a conclusion similarly clouded by 
political influence. The ICJ held that possession of nuclear weapons was not 
prohibited under customary international law, i.e. the concrete rules based on state 
practice, but use of them was unlawful under international humanitarian law, i.e. the 
normative rules found in The Hague and Geneva Conventions60.  Nevertheless, the 
ICJ concluded that although use of nuclear weapons was inconsistent with general 
principles of international law, there may be ‘an extreme circumstance of self-
defence’ where such use may be lawful. 61   Thus, the conclusion was legally 
inconclusive. The court’s political decision permitted the ‘anti-nuclear movement[s]’ 
to continue in support of disarmament in accordance with international humanitarian 
laws, whilst providing ‘powerful states’ with a defence for their refusal to disarm.62  
Additionally, any attempts to ensure a coherent international rule of law would 
require efficient enforcement procedures which guarantee that all States conform to 
international rules and abide by the decisions of international adjudicating bodies. 
Unfortunately, current enforcement mechanisms such as UNSC decisions and the 
ICJ rulings have failed to prevent powerful nations from disregarding international 
laws that are out of touch with their own national interests. Weak enforcement 
mechanisms make it evident that international laws have a weak constraining force 
against powerful nations and vice-versa. The fragility of contemporary international 
proceedings is examined in the subsequent section of this article.  
 
 
                                                        
59
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226 
60
 Hague Convention(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 October 1907); Protocols 
Additional to Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 3 
61
 Nuclear Weapons, (n59), 266 
62
 Murphy, (n56), 34 
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The Fragility of International Decisions and Rulings 
In Nicaragua v USA63 the ICJ had to determine the legality of United States’ actions 
in Nicaragua during 1983 to 1984. In accordance with Article 38 of the Charter,64 the 
court carefully examined state practice to determine the opinio juris of non-
intervention and use of force as per ‘international custom’.65  Evidence of these 
principles as opinio juris was proven through the prohibitions in the following 
conventions: the Declaration on Principles of International law concerning Friendly 
Relations & Co-operation among States,66 the Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States,67 and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.68 
Moreover, the International Law Commission stated that the prohibition of the use of 
force could now be understood as a ‘having the character of jus cogens’.69 As such, 
the ICJ held that the United States’ (US) attacks in Nicaragua during 1983 to 1984, 
namely their ‘laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of the Republic of 
Nicaragua’70 and ‘embargo on trade with Nicaragua’ in 1985, constituted a breach of 
Nicaraguan sovereign rights as well as obligations under customary international 
law. 
However, the court’s ruling in Nicaraguan favour did not grant a real solution 
to the dispute with the United States. Despite the US’ previous affirmation that the 
principle of non-intervention and use of force was ‘a universally recognized principle 
of international law’ and a ‘principle of jus cogens’71 , they rejected the judgment of 
                                                        
63
 Nicaragua, (n6) 
64
 UN Charter, (n3), art.38 
65
 Nicaragua, (n6), 97 
66
 (24 October 1970) A/RES/25/2625 
67
 (26 December 1933) 165 LNTS 19 
68
 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE): Final Act of Helsinki (1 August 1975) 
69
 Nicaragua, (n6), 100 
70
 Ibid.,147 
71
 Ibid.,101 
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the ICJ in the instant case. This was followed by a withdrawal of compulsory 
jurisdiction from the court in the following year. The legal resolution had failed to 
provide a practical solution in the world of politics. In an effort to hold the US 
accountable, Nicaragua used the UN Charter provision ‘to submit non-compliance 
with the [ICJ] ruling’72 to the Security Council, where it would be scrutinized. Still, this 
effort failed when the US vetoed the Council’s resolution condemning their actions.73 
The inability of the ICJ and Security Council to bind the US to the concrete rules of 
international custom, established in the present case, revealed that these norms had 
succumbed to power politics and became ‘an apology for the interests of the 
powerful’74 i.e. the United States.  
The US-led invasion of Iraq further confirmed the weak constraining force of 
normative international rules. In 2002, under the administration of President Bush, 
the United States confronted the UN Security Council (UNSC) with a request to ‘take 
action against Bagdad’ 75  for their refusal to disarm. Consequently, the Council 
formed Resolution 144176 which stated that Iraq was in ‘material breach’77 of prior 
resolutions 678 and 687. Inspectors implementing Resolution 1441 returned after 
investigating for eleven weeks with the view that there was no evidence of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction in Iraq, contrary to what had been claimed by the US. 
Nevertheless, in the February of 2003, the US told the UNSC that they would be 
entering Iraq to institute ‘regime change’78 with or without their approval. The Council 
then released a resolution stating that Iraq had failed their obligations under 
                                                        
72
 Murphy, (n56), 31 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Koskenniemi, (n10), 11 
75
 Michael J Glennon, ‘Why the Security Council Failed’, (2003) 82:3 Foreign Affairs 16, 17 
76
 UNSC Res 1441 (2002) UN Doc S/RES/1441 
77
 Ibid.,3 
78
 Glennon, (n75), 18 
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Resolution 1441, but the resolution did not authorise the use of force in Iraq. The US 
invaded Iraq in the March of that year nonetheless. 
As per Article 51 of the UN Charter, states have the right to self-defence only 
‘if an armed attack occurs against a Member State of the United Nations’. 79 
Therefore, the US announcement in 2002 that they were prepared to ‘act pre-
emptively’80 was unlawful. Furthermore, article 2(4) of the Charter explicitly prohibits 
the use of force, with the only exception being an authorisation by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Notably, the ICJ held in Advisory Opinion 
on Namibia81 that ‘the language of a resolution […] should be carefully analysed 
before a conclusion can be made to its binding effect’82. The fact that the UNSC had 
authority to approve affirmative action in Iraq was not disputed. However, Resolution 
1441 did not explicitly authorise the use of force and the decision cannot possibly 
have been made with the intent of encouraging an invasion which caused 
‘widespread loss of life, and […] destabilize[d] the area’.83 The US’ actions in pursuit 
of national security showed a blatant disregard of the ‘use of force’ prohibitions in the 
Charter.84 As such, it may be said then that ‘an obligation on the state exists only as 
long as it is in the interest of the state’.85 Once states no longer see the need to be 
bound by an obligation, it becomes a utopian paper rule, that is, a rule which can 
neither invoke state practice nor explain the realities of geopolitics.  
 
 
                                                        
79
 UN Charter, (n3), art.51 
80
 Glennon, (n75), 20 
81
 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16 
82
 Ibid.,53, [114] 
83
 Bingham, (n49), 126 
84
 UN Charter, (n3), art.2 
85
 Klabbers, (n11), 14 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this discussion was to demonstrate that international law is incapable 
of resolving disputes between states without the influence of politics. Sovereign 
equality remains relevant since it is the free will of states to be bound that gives 
international law binding force. Yet sovereign equality also represents a key reason 
for the failure of legal resolutions because ‘actual consent’ is often required to give 
these rules authority.86  In addition to this, the UN’s differentiation of ‘right-thinking 
states’ from ‘second-class sovereign states’ or civilised nations vis-à-vis 
‘undemocratic (or uncivilized) states’87 shows that even true sovereign equality is 
questionable. In this system, international norms apply differently to states 
depending on their ‘position […] in the legal order’88. This was evident in the US-led 
invasion of Iraq, where the US’ conduct breached international law and ultimately 
forced Iraq to accept the Security Council’s Resolution 1441. The principle of 
sovereign equality would have required Iraq’s consent for the imposition of 
Resolution 1441. However, Iraq, as an ‘outlaw state’, 89  could not rely on the 
sovereign principles of ‘territorial integrity and political independence’90 to prevent 
the US’ intrusion. Consent or the lack thereof appeared to be valued more from the 
US than from Iraq. In this case, sovereign equality succumbed to power politics. 
Furthermore, sovereign equality permits states to ‘withdraw’ from any 
previously accepted rule.91  The US conduct in Nicaragua and their invasion of Iraq 
demonstrated how international norms can dissolve into ‘apologism’92 when there is 
                                                        
86
 Lister, (n4), 665 
87
 Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal 
Order (CUP, 2004), 20 
88
 Ibid. 
89
 Ibid.,10 
90
 Ibid. 
91
 Klabbers, (n11), 3 
92
 Koskenniemi, (n10), 21 
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a lack of disincentives to prevent breaches of international law. Another issue is the 
need for ‘consent to jurisdiction’ 93 of the international courts. Of the current Security 
Council Members, only one, the United Kingdom, has given the ICJ compulsory 
jurisdiction. This abstinence by the remaining members safeguards their political 
interests, as it becomes almost impossible to hold the state accountable for a breach 
of international norms if there is no court to adjudicate the matter. Arguably, a major 
flaw in the quest for international rule of law is the lack of ‘compulsory recourse’94 to 
the ICJ. 
Ultimately, an examination of international jurisprudence shows that states 
often only abide by international laws and obligations that appeal to their national 
interests. The Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons 95  clarified that the ‘state 
survival remain[s] the highest objective’ 96  of the international legal structure, 
suggesting that it is impossible for an international rule of law to exist without the 
influence of international politics. 97  Very often, international norms feature as ‘a 
symptom of State behaviour’ rather than ‘a cause’ of it.98 Therefore, to develop a 
strong international legal regime, it may be necessary for international rules to ‘flow 
from political commitments’99 since these will often determine which international 
rules are observed by the state. This will ensure that perceived normative ‘working 
rules’100 do not become ‘mere paper rules’.101 Until then, the International Courts’ 
                                                        
93
 Lister, (n4), 665 
94
 Bingham, (n49), 128 
95
 Nuclear Weapons, (n59) 
96
 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘What is International law For?’, The Politics of International law (Hart 
Publishing, 2011), 247 
97
 Koskenniemi, (n10), 5 
98
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Relations, Principle Theories’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International law (2011), 6 
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100
 Ibid.,24 
101
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inability to resolve state disputes through the sole use of legal concepts will continue 
to prove that ‘[s]ocial conflict must still be solved by political means’.102  
                                                        
102
 Koskenniemi, (n10), 7 
